Subsidiary Corporations in New York: When Is Mere Ownership Enough to Establish Jurisdiction over the Parent by Wellborn, Charles I.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 22 
Number 3 Judicial Secrecy: A Symposium Article 2 
4-1-1973 
Subsidiary Corporations in New York: When Is Mere Ownership 
Enough to Establish Jurisdiction over the Parent 
Charles I. Wellborn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles I. Wellborn, Subsidiary Corporations in New York: When Is Mere Ownership Enough to Establish 
Jurisdiction over the Parent, 22 Buff. L. Rev. 681 (1973). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol22/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS IN NEW YORK: WHEN IS MERE




n the past 150 years a vast amount of litigation has focused on the
extent to which corporations are subject to suit in states other
than their state of incorporation. Among the many issues which
remain unresolved is whether and to what extent ownership by a
parent corporation of stock in a local subsidiary constitutes "doing
business" or provides some other basis for jurisdiction over the
parent. This article is concerned with that issue alone and does not
discuss the circumstances which would make the subsidiary itself
amenable to suit.
I. BACKGROUND DEVELOPMENTS
When corporations ventured outside their state of incorporation
for the purpose of carrying on business, the states in which these
"local" (as distinguished from interstate) activities were conducted
required that these foreign corporations consent to suit in their
courts.' To deal with foreign corporations which conducted local
business within the state but had given no formal consent, the
concept of implied consent was developed. By engaging in business
in the state, the foreign corporations had consented to being sued
there.2 As an alternative theory, it was said that a foreign corporation
might be "present" in the stateand thus amenable to suit where
the corporation was "doing business."3 Under this test, the question
* Member of the New Mexico Bar. B.A., University of New Mexico, 1963; J.D.,
1966; L.L.M., New York University, 1972.
1. LaFayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
2. Id.
3. See Philadelphia & R.R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917):
A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in
the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such
manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there.
See also Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
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of presence was decided with reference to the nature and frequency
of the corporation's activities within the state.
4
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,5 the Supreme Court
rejected the consent and presence theories as "mechanical or quanti-
tative" and substituted a qualitative criterion. All that is required
in order that due process not be denied, held the Court, is that the
foreign corporation have "certain minimum contacts" with the forum
such that maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and pro-
tection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may
give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of
or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most cases, hardly be said to be undue.7
This latter theme was expounded upon again in Travelers Health
Association v. Virginia,8 where the Court upheld the state's power to
require a foreign insurance company issuing policies to Virginia
residents to consent to service within the state because it is no denial
of due process for the state to protect its citizens from having to go
out of state to enforce claims against the foreign insurer. Nor is it a
denial of due process-said the Court in Perkins v. Benguet Con-
solidated Mining Co.9-for a state to accept jurisdiction of an in
personam proceeding to enforce a cause of action not arising out of
the corporation's activities in the state if the corporation engaged in
substantial, continuous and systematic activities in that state. In
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.10 the Court made it clear
that a single contact with the forum state would be sufficient to satisfy
due process by requiring a foreign insurer to defend in the forum
4. Under either the "implied consent" or "presence" theories, the test for de-
termining jurisdiction was whether the corporation was "doing business." But there was
a divergence of opinion under each test whether the foreign corporation could be sued
on causes of action unrelated to its activity in the state. See text accompanying note 47
infra. There was also considerable divergence of opinion over the nature and amount of
activity sufficient to constitute "doing business."
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. Id. at 316.
7. Id. at 319.
8. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
9. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
10. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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state, where the suit was based on a contract which had a substantial
connection with that state. There the contract of insurance was
delivered in, the premiums mailed from, and the insured a resident
of the forum state. Yet McGee did not remove all the limitations
surrounding the personal jurisdiction of state courts. In Hanson v.
Denckla,"1 the Court stated that "in each case . . . there [must] be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State .... -12
II. THE Cannon CASE
Since the primary concern of this article is the parent-subsidiary
relationship as a basis for jurisdiction over the parent corporation,
our attention should first be directed to Cannon Manufacturing Co. v.
Cudahy Packing Co.1' because of the great impact that case has had
on the development of law in this area.
In Cannon, a North Carolina corporation brought suit in that
state against a Maine corporation for breach of contract and served
process upon the defendant's subsidiary which was doing business in
North Carolina. The Court described the subsidiary as an "instru-
mentality" employed to market the parent's products in North Carolina
but not as its "agent."' 14 The subsidiary bought Cudahy products from
the parent and sold to dealers. Although distinct corporate entities
existed, the complete domination of the subsidiary by the parent
paralleled domination of the unincorporated selling branches or de-
partments which marketed Cudahy products in other states.' 5 The
action was for an alleged breach of contract by the parent, and was not
related to the subsidiary or its activities in North Carolina.
The issue was whether the parent "was doing business within the
State in such a manner and to such an extent as to warrant the infer-
ence that it was present there."'u No question as to the constitutional
power of the state to subject the parent to its jurisdiction was raised,
and the Court noted that there was no claim that jurisdiction was
11. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
12. Id. at 253.
13. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
14. Id. at 335.
15. Cf. Public Adm'r v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877,
278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967).
16. 267 U.S. at 334-35.
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supported by any state statute or local practice. Reflecting its pre-Erie17
posture, North Carolina decisions were not cited, and the Court noted
that Congress had not declared a parent amenable to suit in such
circumstances. The Court cited certain precedent which indicated that
the use of a subsidiary would not "necessarily" subject the parent corpo-
ration to jurisdiction, and affirmed the dismissal based on the lack of
jurisdiction over the parent.
This case is widely considered to have established as a general
rule that "mere ownership" of a subsidiary will not subject the parent
to the jurisdiction of the state where the subsidiary is doing business.
This is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, the decision is not
based on any federal matter but rather is reflective of the pre-Erie
concept of a "transcendental body of law outside of any particular
state."' 8 Thus while some courts regard Cannon as a statement of due
process limitations, it is rather nothing more than the Supreme Court's
conception as to what constituted "doing business" at that time. Indeed,
Arrowsmith v. United Press International9 has now established the
general rule that in diversity cases the question of whether a defendant
is amenable to service of process is determined in the first instance
with reference to state law. Where jurisdiction is found, federal law
is relevant to decide whether the state's assertion of jurisdiction is
offensive to due process requirements.
Second, the decision is based upon the concept of "presence" which
was scrapped in International Shoe and replaced by the less rigid
"minimum contacts" approach. As the Supreme Court said in the
McGee decision:
In a continuing process of evolution this Court accepted and then
abandoned "consent," "doing business," and "presence" as the
standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over such
corporations ...
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other non-residents. In
part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy over the years. Today many commercial transac-
tions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated
17. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. See id.; Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928).
19. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
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by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of com-
merce has come a great increase in the amount of business con-
ducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modem trans-
portation and communication have made it much less burdensome
for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity20
In short, the Cannon decision was a product of its time and its cur-
rency has long since passed.2'
III. IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD
With this background, it may be well to consider some basic
concepts before being exposed to the treatment of the issue in the
cases. Virtually all of the cases dealing with the subject have agreed
that there is inherent in corporate existence a limitation on amena-
bility-a "limited amenability"-which is coexistent with limited
liability. Yet no decision explores the nature or origin of this supposed
feature of corporate existence. The courts have simply assumed that
both limited liability and limited amenability may be lost under the
same circumstances.
22
The Restatement of Conflicts (Second) also accepts the "limited
amenability" analysis. According to a comment to section 52, "a state
does not have judicial jurisdiction over a parent corporation merely
because a subsidiary of the parent does business within its territory.1
23
It will be subject to that jurisdiction, it says, only when the subsidiary
does "acts" or "causes effects" in the state "at the direction of the
parent corporation," or if the parent "so controls or dominates the
subsidiary" that its independent corporate existence is disregarded.24
These are theories common to "piercing the corporate veil" for liability
purposes. Insofar as jurisdiction is concerned, they seem merely to beg
the question. Common sense tells us that where a subsidiary corpora-
20. 355 U.S. at 222-23.
21. See Cardozo, A New Footnote in Erie v. Tompkins: "Cannon is Overruled," 36
N.C.L. REv. 181 (1958).
22. In New York for example, only in the recent Frummer decision has a court
distinguished the two and that was over a very vigorous dissent. Frummer v. Hilton
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 52, comment (1971). These same
rules apply without change as to jurisdiction over a subsidiary whose parent does busi-
ness within the state.
24. Id.
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tion is organized by a parent any act done by the subsidiary will be at
the direction of the parent unless clearly outside the scope of the
subsidiary's business-whatever fiction may be maintained as to its
autonomy. Section 52 itself recognizes reasonableness as the guide for
determining when the state may exercise its jurisdiction. Yet it seems
that equating (1) liability of the parent for acts of the subsidiary with
(2) whether a court should require the citizens of its state to go to the
jurisdiction of the parent for their day in court, is most unreasonable-
particularly since that analysis ignores the fact that the parent may
derive substantial economic benefit from the intrastate activities of its
subsidiary.
Is there a foundation for the concept of limited amenability?
The powers and rights of corporations and shareholders find their basis
in the law of the state of incorporation. The corporation has power to
sue and be sued in its corporate name25 and thus at least for some
purposes is an entity. Corporations typically also have power to own
shares in other corporations.26 And the limited liability of shareholders
is also expressly a part of these corporation statutes.27 However, no
state's corporation law attempts or could attempt to limit the extent
to which a corporation shall be subject to the jurisdiction of another
state. The amenability of corporations to suit in other states is de-
termined by the jurisdictional law of those states and the only limita-
tions on it, as seen earlier, are federal due process limitations. It hardly
seems possible that such niceties as separate incorporation are im-
portant when the legal standard is "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."28
In fact, it was recognized almost fifty years ago that "limited
amenability" is not an inherent right by virtue of which parent
corporations may avoid jurisdiction where their subsidiaries do busi-
ness. In 1925, Professor Ballantine responded to the Cannon decision
by writing that the issue of whether a parent corporation is doing
business through its subsidiaries "may be treated as an entirely different
question" from that of loss of limited liability.29 He stated further:
The doctrine that the parent corporation is not deemed to be
25. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(b) (1969).
26. Id. § 4(g).
27. Id. § 25.
28. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
29. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF.
L. REv. 12 (1925).
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doing business through its subsidiaries, in the eye of the law, may
be regarded as a somewhat technical rule adopted from practical
reasons of policy to limit the somewhat arbitrary power exercised by
the various states over foreign corporations.3 0
Thus it seems that what the courts have been treating as a some-
what inflexible corporate norm for so many years was considered only
a matter of policy in 1925, and was adopted as a means of dealing
with the issues that International Shoe and subsequent Supreme Court
cases eventually defined.
In his monumental work Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations,31
Professor Latty agreed with the Ballantine analysis.
The lack of jurisdiction is put upon the familiar ground that the
parent and subsidiary are different persons and that the subsidiary is
the person who is "present" or "found" or "doing .business" in the
state or district, not the parent. As usual, this is putting the cart before
the horse. It is not that there is no jurisdiction because the two
corporations are necessarily different persons; rather, the point is
that since there are reasons (or at least, so the court thinks) for
denying that jurisdiction exists over a parent simply because it exists
over the subsidiary, therefore one may treat the two, under such
circumstances, like different persons.
... The problem in these jurisdiction cases is to be solved not by
saying that the subsidiary is or is not the mere instrumentality of the
parent, but by seeking the reasons why the foreign parent should not
be subjected to local jurisdiction, simply because the subsidiary is so
subjected, notwithstanding the parent's ownership of substantially
all the subsidiary's stock.
32
Professor Latty then mentions the reason for denying jurisdiction over
the parent suggested by Professor Ballantine and-anticipating In-
ternational Shoe's "balancing" standard-suggests a possible counter-
vailing consideration:
[A] court may feel these reasons are overbalanced by the injustice
which it may believe to follow from allowing the parent to do busi-
ness all over the country and yet be suable only at home.33
Accepting the Ballantine-Latty view that the test should simply
be one of fairness, what kind of analysis is appropriate today? It might
30. Id. at 14.
31. E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS (1936).
32. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
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be proposed that the parent should be amenable to the jurisdiction
of the state where its subsidiary has the requisite minimum contacts
whenever it is reasonable to conclude that the parent and subsidiary
constitute a "single economic entity."3 4 Under the proposed analysis,
the acts of the subsidiary would be attributed to the parent such that
the court would have judicial jurisdiction over the parent to the same
extent that it would the subsidiary. The court would remain responsi-
ble for weighing the interests and conveniences of the parties, but
any question as to the consequences of separate incorporation would
already be resolved. This broad proposal may be illustrated by the
following examples.
First, where there is such a commingling of management and af-
fairs of parent and subsidiary that the subsidiary lacks independent
existence, the parent would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the
subsidiary's state. This is so only because the two corporations clearly
constitute a "single economic entity," and would not necessarily result
in the parent's loss of limited liability in respect to the subsidiary.
Irrespective of any failure to maintain this intercorporate separa-
tion, the subsidiary's activities should render the parent amenable to
local jurisdiction to the same extent as the subsidiary when, considering
the nature of the business activities of each corporation and the dealings
between them, it is clear that the two are component parts of the
same enterprise. A typical example would be a manufacturing con-
cem which organizes subsidiaries in other states or countries to sell
and service the manufacturer's products.
Where the corporations constitute a "single economic entity,"
the acts of the parent would be attributed to the out-of-state subsidiary
in the same way,35 and there would be attribution as between brother-
sister corporations which are part of a "single economic entity."
At the opposite end of such a scale would be a corporation which
is a subsidiary of one of today's conglomerates and which carries on
business activities of a nature not carried on or directly complemented
by an affiliated corporation in the forum state. The "complementary"
nature of these activities could be measured with reference to an "arm's-
length" standard common in the law of taxation and often applied
in determining proper allocations of income and deductions between
related taxpayers.
34. Cf. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 CoLum. L. R~v. 343 (1947).
35. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 52, comment (1971).
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As suggested hereinafter, the New York Court of Appeals may
have taken the first steps towards adopting such an approach. It may
be suggested therefore that "mere ownership" is enough in cases where
the parent and subsidiary corporations constitute a "single economic
entity."
IV. NEW YoRK LAW
A. The "Presence" Standard
Before examining the New York parent-subsidiary cases, a quick
review should be made of the standard utilized in New York as a basis
for the exercise of jurisdiction.
Prior to International Shoe, the New York courts had developed
a "presence" test for determining whether a foreign corporation was
"doing business." If the corporation was "present," jurisdiction was
sustained although the cause of action sued upon did not originate in
the business transacted in New York.36
After International Shoe, many state courts in construing the
meaning of "doing business" began to move irresistibly toward the
limits of federal due process. It was argued that previous interpreta-
tions of "doing business" were based on the state courts' conception
of the limits of due process. 37 In New York, it was held that a change
in previous interpretations of that term was a matter for the legisla-
ture, not the courts,38 despite the fact that the Supreme Court of the
United States had adapted its jurisdictional standards to the times
without legislative direction.39 Amendments to the New York Civil
Practice Act carried over those interpretations by statut 4 0 while adding
a "long-arm" statute41 to make even a single transaction or act sufficient
to subject the corporation to local jurisdiction provided that the
cause of action arose from that act. Thus, generally speaking, while
a single act does not constitute "doing business" under the "presence"
test, it may be sufficient under the "long-arm" statute where the cause
of action arises out of that act.42 On the other hand, whether or not
36. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
37. See, e.g., Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427,
251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
38. Id. at 287, 200 N.E.2d at 430, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 437-38.
39. Cf. quotation accompanying note 20 supra.
40. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1963).
41. Id. § 302.
42. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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the cause of action originates in the business transacted in New York,
jurisdiction will be sustained if the foreign corporation is "present." 43
The classic standard as to whether the corporation is doing business
continues to be that announced in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.:
when the corporation is "here, not occasionally or casually, bt with
a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then, whether its busi-
ness is interstate or local, it is within the jurisdiction of our courts." 44
This standard may be changing in substance if not in form. Quite
recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the New York
Court of Appeals has sustained in personam jurisdiction under the
"doing business" test each time it has considered the issue in the past
decade.45 According to one commentator: "The New York Court of
Appeals has in fact interred Tauza and has adopted the more fluid
notion of minimum contacts."46 As will be seen, indications of at least
partial burial of any rigid standard are apparent in current Court of
Appeals decisions respecting parent-subsidiary corporations.
B. New York Parent-Subsidiary Decisions
All the king's horses and all the king's men could not assemble
the New York decisions in such a way that one could draw any but
the most general conclusions from them. Therefore, they have been
arranged herein primarily by their result. The first group consists of
cases which are consistent with the Cannon analysis. Next are those in
which the finding of jurisdiction was influenced by the fact that the
parent itself had engaged in some activity in the state. In the third
group, the subsidiary was considered to be the "agent," "instrumen-
tality," "adjunct" or "arm" of the parent and as a result the parent
was subject to New York jurisdiction. Finally, the most current New
York decisions on the subject are analyzed.
1. The "Cannon" cases. While the Cannon decision was an un-
desirable influence, New York had reached the same result somewhat
earlier in a case which indicates the deep roots of the limited liability-
equals-limited amenability concept. In Robert Dollar Co. v. Canadian
43. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
44. Id. at 276, 115 N.E. at 917; see Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 29 N.Y.2d
426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
45. The Delagi case, in which in personam jurisdiction was denied, was decided
after Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1972).
46. McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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Car & Foundry Co.,47 a Canadian corporation which had been doing
business in New York organized a subsidiary to which it assigned New
York contracts. The parent withdrew after guaranteeing the perform-
ance of the contract and furnishing its own employees to act as direc-
tors of the subsidiary. Depending on how the contract was performed,
the parent stood to make or lose a large sum of money. The court held
the question of whether the parent was doing business "a simple one."
Since the subsidiary was a separate corporation, no activities by it
could make the parent amenable to suit in New York.
This position was solidified by Cannon and the often-cited Com-
pania Mexicana Refinadora Island v. Compania Metropolitana de
Oleoductos48 decision three years after Cannon. There the Court of Ap-
peals stated that New York courts could acquire jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations only if those corporations were actually present in
the state. Therefore the acts of a parent corporation would not subject
its foreign subsidiary to local jurisdiction despite the parent's disregard
of the separate corporate existence of the subsidiary. Later cases citing
the decision generally overlooked the fact that the court's rationale-
that the parent's activities were actually on its own behalf and not for
the benefit of its subsidiary-would likely be inapplicable where the
activities locally are by a subsidiary rather than a parent of one corpo-
ration sought to be subjected to jurisdiction in the forum.
The more usual factual situation was presented in cases such as
Vaughan Motors, Inc. v. Socidte Anonyme des Automobiles Peugeot49
where a French corporation organized a New York subsidiary to pro-
mote, sell and service its automobiles in the United States. All automo-
biles sold in America were sold to the subsidiary, with title passing in
France. The plaintiff argued that the parent was doing business in
New York. Although the only reason for the corporation's existence
was to market the products of the parent, the court reasoned that the
acts of the subsidiary could not be attributed to the parent because
the subsidiary had its own employees, bank account, books and
records."0 The court quoted extensively from the Cannon opinion and
concluded that the parent had the right to use the subsidiary in this
47. 100 Misc. 564, 166 N.Y.S. 34 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., 180 App. Div. 895, 167
N.Y.S. 1124 (lst Dep't 1917).
48. 250 N.Y. 203, 164 N.E. 907 (1928).
49. 30 Misc. 2d 1047, 220 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
50. Id. at 1049, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
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way without subjecting itself to suit in the jurisdiction.5' To the court,
the most important factor was the strict observance of all corporate
formalities as to the subsidiary. The court's failure to analyze the rela-
tionship between parent and subsidiary in "pragmatic"5 2 terms re-
sembled the analysis of many other decisions. In Donner v. Wein-
berger's Hair Shops, Inc.,53 for example, an Illinois corporation had or-
ganized a New York subsidiary for the sole purpose of marketing its
cosmetics in New York. The parent challenged the jurisdiction of
the New York courts and the Appellate Division remanded the case
for further evidence to determine whether Helene Curtis Sales, Inc.,
was acting "in pursuit of its own corporate purpose"54 or as an instru-
mentality of its parent, Helene Curtis Industries, Inc.
There are other New York decisions reflecting strict adherence
to the Cannon rule,5 5 but none applied it more inflexibly than the
Southern District of New York in three decisions involving British
Overseas Airways Corporation.56 Relying on Cannon, the court de-
termined that if the "corporate separation, though perhaps merely
formal, was real"57 the parent was not doing business in the subsidiary's
state. In one decision, the test was whether the subsidiary had its own
separate financial structure, officers and employees; 8 and in another,
whether the subsidiary had been deprived of "any independent corpo-
rate existence or financial responsibility" was determinative."0 All three
cases concerned the activities of the American subsidiary of DeHavil-
land Aircraft Co. which was organized in this country for the purpose
51. Id. at 1049-50, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95.
52. An analysis suggested in Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208
N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
53. 280 App. Div. 67, 111 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Ist Dep't 1952).
54. Id. at 70, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
55. E.g., Mink v. Lago Oil & Transp. Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 853, 854, 271 N.Y.S.2d
189, 190 (2d Dep't 1966) (Benjamin, J., dissenting); Steingold v. Capital Airlines,
Inc., 34 Misc. 2d 33, 227 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd mene., 19 App. Div. 2d
778, 242 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d Dep't 1963), aff'd on rehearing, 47 Misc. 2d 988, 263
N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (on forum non conveniens grounds); Joseph Walker &
Sons v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 8 Misc. 2d 1005, 167 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct.
1957); Blau v. Martin, 8 Misc. 2d 54, 167 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Savadge v.
Transportes Aeros Centro Americanos, 187 Misc. 921, 66 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
56. Anderson v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 149 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Anderson v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 144 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); State
St. Trust Co. v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 144 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
57. 144 F. Supp. at 243.
58. See id. at 243-44.
59. Id. at 547.
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of engaging in the business activities of its parent-a circumstance to
which the decisions attributed little significance.
The Second Circuit found an opportunity to boost the Cannon
rule in a suit brought in New York against a New York parent corpo-
ration.0° The court said Cannon was the "leading" case and that it sur-
vived the International Shoe decision, citing a previous opinion which
had not mentioned that case.61 A New York parent had established a
Florida subsidiary to sell clothes furnished by the parent's central buy-
ing service. Although the parent had guaranteed the lease of its sub-
sidiary, and their directors were identical, under Florida law the parent
was not "doing business" because the parent and subsidiary had
dealt with each other as separate corporate entities.
Doubtless in some cases the courts were compelled to conclude that
the parent was not doing business in New York because the fact of
ownership of stock in the subsidiary was the only link to New York
shown by plaintiff's evidence. Thus, in Nursery Plastics, Inc. v. Newton
& Thompson, Inc.,62 the court stated that the fact of ownership was all
that the plaintiff had shown and therefore held the parent not
amenable to jurisdiction in New York.6 3 While the obvious sugges-
tion is that the plaintiff should have made a better showing, the gen-
eral tendency to apply the Cannon rule at the outset may well have
limited the plaintiff's opportunity to engage in the kind of discovery
necessary to bolster his case.
2. Parent Conducting Activities in New York. Not all New York
courts applied the Cannon rule with such inflexibility: a sizable
number were able to evade the Cannon rule. Though these "excep-
tions" were not always for the best reasons, they seem to indicate
judicial realization of the basic unfairness of permitting the parent
to escape jurisdiction solely because of the utilization of a separate
corporation to carry on and further its business activities in New York.
Several cases involved activities in New York by the parent itself,
and these activities, when combined with those of the subsidiaries,
led to the finding that the parent was "doing business." In Maryland
60. Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957).
61. The case cited was Echeverry v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 175 F.2d
900 (2d Cir. 1949).
62. 19 Misc. 2d 883, 191 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup. Ct. 1959); cf. Noble v. Singapore
Resort Motel, 21 N.Y.2d 1006, 238 N.E.2d 328, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
63. Accord, Simonson v. International Bank, 16 App. Div. 2d 55, 225 N.Y.S.2d
392, aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
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v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 64 two subsidiaries were organized by a British
parent to carry on business in New York. One subsidiary handled
sales activities and the other handled after-sales service activities,
both of which had previously been carried on in New York by the
parent. The court noted that personnel were shifted between parent
and subsidiary and that the parent's financial transactions with the
subsidiary were not at arm's length. But it also emphasized the signifi-
cant amount of activity in New York by agents of the parent itself.
The court did not make the basis of its decision clear, but in light
of all of the foregoing concluded that the parent was "doing business."06
Avoiding the Cannon rule, two courts found that the action of
the parent in investing in the subsidiary constituted "doing business"
in New York because the parent was in the business of making such
investments. In Shapiro v. Huntington,0 the court found that the
parent functioned solely as a holding company and therefore the
acts it performed in New York in furtherance of that purpose were
sufficient to constitute "doing business." Clearly, simply buying the
stock in another corporation would in the ordinary case not be
enough to constitute "doing business," but here the court suggested
a test somewhat like the tax law principle that "business bad debts"
are those incurred by one who is engaged in making such investments
as a trade or business in itself.67 Similar reasoning was employed in
Rubinstein v. Bouard,68 where the court remanded the case for the
taking of further evidence.
An analogous argument was made by the plaintiff in Blaustein v.
Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co.'0 He claimed that since the
parent paid compensation to its employees for acting as directors
of the New York subsidiary and, in addition, paid the expenses which
they incurred in coming to New York for that purpose, the parent
itself was "doing business" in the state. But the court rejected the
64. 199 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
65. The combination of activity by both the parent's agents and the subsidiary
also sufficed to make the parent subject to suit in New York in Webster v. Doane, 137
Misc. 513, 241 N.Y.S. 242 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (service of process upheld). See also
Spacarb, Inc. v. Automatic Canteen Co. of America, 101 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
66. 34 Misc. 2d 599, 226 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
67. See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
68. 176 Misc. 680, 28 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 262 App. Div. 835, 28
N.Y.S.2d 403 (Ist Dep't 1941).
69. 163 Misc. 749, 297 N.Y.S. 539 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 251 App. Div. 704,
296 N.Y.S. 996 (Ist Dep't 1937).
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argument, relying on Cannon, and stated that the activities of the
directors were on behalf of the subsidiary and not on behalf of the
parent.
3. Agencies, Instrumentalities, Adjuncts and Arms. Where the
parent has itself conducted no activities in New York, the courts have
avoided the Cannon rule primarily through reliance on principles
developed under various theories of "piercing the corporate veil." This
is unfortunate not only because it is an inappropriate parallel but
because it is an area of the law that is already extremely uncertain.
In applying these principles, the courts have variously described the
subsidiary as an "agent," "instrumentality," "adjunct" or "arm" of
the parent. Use of these labels has been relatively indiscriminate,
and it is impossible to break the cases down except into two broad
and overlapping categories: those in which the court was concerned
primarily with the nature and extent of the activities carried on by
the subsidiary on behalf of its parent; and those which emphasized
the general commingling of affairs and operations of parent and
subsidiary.
The original application of this analysis was in American Tri-
Ergon Corp. v. Ton-Bild Syndikat, A.G.70 where the court indicated
that Cannon would not apply where "the subsidiary was not acting
as an independent agent but rather as one subject to the control and
direction of the parent."
7 1
In Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece,72 the
subsidiary had an independent business but received deposits on
behalf of its parent and dealt with those depositors on behalf of the
parent. Further, it financed wheat shipments of the parent and trans-
acted other business of the parent on forms kept by the subsidiary for
that purpose. Because it had dealt directly on behalf of the parent, the
court held that the subsidiary was a "mere instrumentality" even
though the corporations observed their distinct corporate entities.
Similarly in Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distributing
Co.,73 the Court of Appeals found that a South African corporation
70. 145 Misc. 344, 260 N.Y.S. 139 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 236 App. Div. 792,
258 N.Y.S. 1061 (1st Dep't 1932).
71. 145 Misc. at 345, 260 N.Y.S. at 140.
72. 166 Misc. 190, 2 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd mem., 254 App. Div.
728, 4 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't), motion for leave to amend denied, 254 App. Div.
836, 6 N.Y.S.2d 332 (lst Dep't 1938).
73. 299 N.Y. 208, 86 N.E.2d 564 (1949).
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whose shareholders owned the shares of a New York corporation
was doing business in New York because the local corporation was
the "exclusive buying agent" of the South African corporation. Relying
on this case, other courts held that where a subsidiary acts as an
"exclusive buying agent," its parent is doing business.74 Yet it is not
clear why the same rationale has been equally applicable in cases
where the subsidiary is the exclusive "selling agent" of the parent
such as the Peugeot sales subsidiary7 or the Helene Curtis sales
subsidiary.
70
In the foregoing cases, the nature of the subsidiary's activities
made the parent amenable to jurisdiction, but in other cases the courts
pointed to some failure to observe the separate corporate entity of
the subsidiary or to the fact that it had little independent economic
substance. Thus in Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp. 17 service on
an officer of the subsidiary was upheld because the operations of the
subsidiary, a New York sales outlet for the parent manufacturer, and
those of the parent were deeply intertwined both as to management
and finance, and the "separate identity of the sales corporation was
nominal only.
78
In American Cities Power & Light Corp. v. Williams7 the parent
had previously engaged in the business activities being carried on by
the subsidiary but organized a New York subsidiary to reduce its
franchise taxes. The officers and directors of the parent assumed the
same positions in the subsidiary, and the parent directed and used the
subsidiary as a vehicle for ownership, purchase and sale of securities.
The subsidiary having no independent substance, the court held the
parent amenable to jurisdiction of the New York courts and upheld
service on an officer of the subsidiary.
Where a British parent assigned copyrights to its American sub-
sidiary which was to exploit them at its cost and return all other
74. E.g., Kimberling Knitvear, Inc. v. Mid-West Pool Car Ass'n, 191 N.Y.S.2d
347 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1959) (local corporation owned and utilized by several unrelated
foreign corporations).
75. Vaughan Motors, Inc. v. Socit6 Anonyme des Automobiles Peugeot, 30 Misc.
2d 1047, 220 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
76. Donner v. Weinberger's Hair Shops, Inc., 280 App. Div. 67, 111 N.Y.S.2d
310 (lst Dep't 1952).
77. 198 Misc. 707, 96 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem., 278 App.
Div. 584, 102 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1951), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 892, 100 N.E.2d 177
(1951).
78. 302 N.Y. at 893, 100 N.E.2d at 178.
79. 74 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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income received to the parent, a federal district judge found that the
subsidiary was a "mere agent," "instrumentality" or "adjunct" of
the parent and the parent was therefore "doing business" in New
York.8 0
In Little Falls Paper Co. v. Dalemar Paper Corp.,"' a North Caro-
lina corporation was held to be doing business in New York by virtue
of its activities in connection with a New York corporation. This was
not a parent-subsidiary case but one where both corporations were
owned by the same family, all of whose members were found to be
residents of New York. The North Carolina corporation made seventy
per cent of its sales to the New York corporation, kept a bank account
and had the same president as did the New York corporation. The
court found that the two corporations were "united by a common
bloodstream,"82 noting that the members of the family arranged
transactions between the two corporations.
There were several other variations on the same general theme.
In Goodman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,83 an aircraft
manufacturer was held to be doing business in New York by virtue of
the activities of its New York subsidiary. There the issue was whether
the subsidiary was a "managing agent" of the parent for purposes of
service of process. The parent conceded that it was doing business if
the subsidiary was its "managing agent." The court relied on the
fact that the New York subsidiary was organized for the purpose of
handling all foreign sales by the parent and that these sales con-
stituted 98 percent of the subsidiary's business. It noted that the
subsidiary carried no inventory but rather bought from the parent
when an order was obtained. Sales made by the subsidiary carried
the warranty of the parent. On the basis of these facts and the simi-
larity of officers and directors of the two corporations, the court held
the subsidiary "an agent and tool" of the parent.8 4
80. Bator v. Boosey & Hawkes, Ltd., 80 F. Supp. 294, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See
also United States v. Buffalo Weaving & Belting Co., 155 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (business of parent and subsidiary operated as an integrated whole).
81. 205 Misc. 370, 128 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. City Ct. 1954).
82. 205 Misc. at 373, 128 N.Y.S.2d at 307. See also Skupsi v. Western Navigation
Corp., 123 F. Supp. 309, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (affiliated corporation in New York
"agent" for New Jersey corporation).
83. 1 Misc. 2d 959, 148 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 707,
153 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1956).
84. 1 Misc. 2d at 964, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 358; cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 119 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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In Streifer v. Cabol Enterprises, Ltd.,85 the parent utilized the
subsidiary to manage the affairs of another enterprise in New York
which was being acquired by the parent. The court found that the
management of the parent controlled the subsidiary which generated
no income of its own and owed its active existence solely to funds
received from the parent. The court found the subsidiary "an in-
strumentality or agent" of the parent, and held that the parent was
doing business in New York.
4. The Current New York Law. With this background of in-
consistency, the Court of Appeals acted in 1965 to delimit the circum-
stances which constitute doing business in New York through a
subsidiary and indicated that the principles it relied upon had been
laid down fifteen years earlier in the Rabinowitz decision. In Taca
International Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd.,80 the de-
fendant was a British corporation, Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., which
owned all the stock of Rolls-Royce of Canada, Ltd., a Canadian corpora-
tion, which in turn owned the stock of Rolls-Royce, Inc. which was do-
ing business in New York. The sole function of the subsidiary was to act
as the American sales and service department of the British corporation.
The court noted that the corporations had directors in common, and
that its officers, employee training and sales literature were all furn-
ished by the British corporation. The subsidiary bought the cars which
it sold from the British corporation after a sale was made. Holding
that the British corporation was doing business in New York, and
failing to even mention the Cannon case,17 the court said Rabino-
witz was "controlling authority for affirmance." 88 As noted earlier,80
that decision rested heavily on the complete disregard by the parent
of the distinct corporate entity of the subsidiary. In Taca the sub-
sidiary had a no less distinctive corporate personality than any other
85. 231 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1962); cf. Rosario v. Public Serv. Coordinated
Transp., 270 App. Div. 169, 59 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1st Dep't 1945) (where no facts were
set out in the decision which stated only that the subsidiary was not a "mere name or
device" of the parent and held the parent not doing business).
86. 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965). See also Geffen
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 54 Misc. 2d 403, 283 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1967)
(relying on Taca, upheld service made on officer of defendant's sales subsidiary).
87. Having failed to mention Cannon, the court's view of it as precedent is not
clear. But the rigidity of the Cannon rule is certainly inconsistent with the analysis
adopted by the court in Taca and in Frummer where the dissenters unsuccessfully at-
tempted to resurrect it.
88. 15 N.Y.2d at 100, 204 N.E.2d at 330, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
89. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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sales subsidiary could be expected to have and the decision therefore
may be read as one recognizing that, in "pragmatic" 90 terms, the
parent and subsidiary constituted a "single economic entity,"91 and
the acts of the subsidiary were attributable to the parent for purposes
of jurisdiction.
92
Such a conclusion is supported by the decision in Boryk v.
DeHavilland Aircraft Co.93 where it was held that the British parent
was amenable to the jurisdiction of New York by virtue of the activi-
ties of a sales subsidiary in New York, though as noted earlier the
opposite result as to the same company had been achieved several
years earlier.94 On facts similar to those in Taca, the Second Circuit
noted that the Court of Appeals decision in Taca
indicates New York's steady movement towards holding, that in
determining whether a corporation has engaged in activities in the
state, it is immaterial whether these are conducted through a branch
or through a subsidiary corporation, even though the latter's formal
independence has been scrupulously preserved. 95
The decision in Public Administrator v. Royal Bank of Canada96 is
in line with this "single economic entity" analysis, though the case itself
represents a more extreme example of the integration of affairs by the
parent and subsidiary corporations. There a French subsidiary corpo-
ration was held to be doing business in New York by virtue of the
activities of its parent. The court found that there was essentially no
attempt to treat the French corporation as a separate entity and that
the sole reason for its separate incorporation was to avoid the French
tax on the entire capitalization of foreign banks that operate in that
country. Although many cases subjecting parents to local jurisdiction
were based on the idea that the subsidiary was in some way acting
for the parent, this decision that the subsidiary is amenable to juris-
90. A "pragmatic" analysis was suggested in Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline,
15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
91. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
92. It may be questioned though whether the New York courts should have ac-
cepted jurisdiction, applying the principles of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952), in view of the fact that the plaintiff was an El Salvador corpora-
tion seeking recovery for damages alleged to have been incurred in Nicaragua.
93. 341 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965).
94. See cases cited note 56 supra.
95. 341 F.2d at 668.
96. 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967).
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diction might be read as one recognizing that in fact each is part of
a whole and that both serve the same "single economic entity.""7
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,98 is also consistent
with the "single economic entity" analysis. That case concerned corpora-
tions under common ownership rather than parent-subsidiary corpo-
rations. A British hotel corporation (Hilton, U.K.) was held amenable
to suit in New York by virtue of the activities in New York of the
Hilton Credit Corporation which provided a reservation service and
which had ownership in common with Hilton, U.K. The court noted
that the Hilton Credit Corporation in New York leased an office,
had employees and a bank account, and accepted and confirmed hotel
reservations for Hilton, U.K. The court said: "In short-and this is
the significant and pivotal factor-the Service does all the business
which Hilton (U.K.) could do if it were here by its own officials."0
Although the meaning of that statement is not altogether clear, a
subsequent federal decision provided the following interpretation:
[A] foreign corporation is doing business in New York . . . when
its New York representative provides services beyond "mere solicita-
tion" and these services are sufficiently important to the foreign
corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them,
the corporation's own officials would undertake to perform substan-
tially similar services.100
On that basis, the federal court held that a foreign corporation was
doing business in New York by virtue of the activities of an inde-
pendent contractor in New York because without his reservation
service the defendant's Grand Canyon tour, out of which the suit
arose, could not be effectively merchandised.
Did Frummer in essence hold that the activities of the Hilton
Credit Corporation rendered Hilton, U.K. amenable to New York
jurisdiction because the two corporations were part of the same "single
economic entity"? It could be argued that it did. In Miller v. Surf
Properties, Inc.,01 the Court of Appeals held that providing similar
services to an out-of-state corporation would not subject that corpo-
97. See also Gonzales v. Ametak, Inc., 50 Misc. 2d 62, 269 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup.
Ct. 1966); cf. Compania Mexicana Refinadora Island v. Compania Metropolitana de
Oleoductos, 250 N.Y. 203, 164 N.E. 907 (1928).
98. 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
99. Id. at 537, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
100. Gelfand v. Tanner Motors, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1967).
101. 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958).
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ration to New York jurisdiction where the services were provided by
an independent travel agent and the travel agent did not confirm
the reservations. By contrast, in Bryant v. Finnish National Airline10 2
the fact that the same services were provided by employees of the
out-of-state corporation rendered that corporation amenable to New
York jurisdiction even though the employees did not confirm reserva-
tions. In Frummer, the defendant relied on the Miller case but rather
than distinguish Miller solely on the basis that the Hilton Reservation
Service (unlike the travel agent in Miller) had power to confirm
reservations, the court pointed to the relationship of the Service and
Hilton, U.K.:
Although, in the case before us, the Hilton Reservation Service
is not the "employee" of Hilton (U.K.), the Service and that de-
fendant are owned in common by the other defendants and the
Service is concededly run on a "non-profit" basis for the benefit of
the London Hilton and other Hilton hotels.103
Thus the relationship was clearly quite important. In a later para-
graph, the court again mentioned the relationship: "the fact that the
two are commonly owned is significant only because it gives rise to a
valid inference as to the broad scope of the agency . .104 Apparently
this indicated that while the court was not ignoring their corporate
separateness, their affiliation established a sufficient "agency" relation-
ship to allow the exercise of jurisdiction. Thus the relationship of the
two corporations was a deciding factor in the majority's assertion of
jurisdiction.10 5
102. 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
103. 19 N.Y.2d at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
104. Id., 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
105. The lack of clarification in Frummer has already contributed to some highly
questionable results. E.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. S.S. Rialto, 280 F.
Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (no jurisdiction over Canadian subsidiary by virtue of the
activities of its New York parent, citing Frummer but relying on forty-year old Compania
Mexicana Refinadora Island v. Compania Metropolitana de Oleoductos, 250 N.Y.
203, 164 N.E. 907 (1928)); Tokyo Boeki (U.S.A.), Inc. v. S.S. Navarino, 324 F. Supp.
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (found parent doing business but felt it necessary to distinguish
Cannon); Karlin v. Avis, 326 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (opinion does not indi-
cate what the full relationship of parent and subsidiary was, and while Frummer is
cited, the court- appears -to-rely-h- p-Ta--prihCiSles- -a-d-fif-ds--pa-rent- -not-dctig--
business); cf. American Messer Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 45 F.R.D. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (court found it had jurisdiction over parent under long-arm statute
but relied upon activities of parent as well as those of 50%-owned subsidiary); SCM
Corp. v. Brother Int'l Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (parent "doing
business" even though sales subsidiary only 50% owned by parent).
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This construction is borne out by the quite recent case Delagi v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. 106 There the plaintiff sought to obtain juris-
diction over a German corporation on the basis of the activities of
its franchised dealer in New York. Because the dealer was "an inde-
pendently owned corporation, in no way directly related to"107 the
German corporation, a "valid inference of agency" could not be sup-
ported. Reinforcing the point, the court said: "Where, as here, there
exist truly separate corporate entities, not commonly owned, a valid
inference of agency cannot be sustained."108 Subsequent dicta noted
that even if the franchise dealer were a subsidiary of the German
corporation, there was not sufficient "control" of the subsidiary such
that it would be a "mere department." However if it had been a
subsidiary, it seems probable that more control would have existed;
thus the illustration seems meaningless. Moreover the lack of "control"
itself is inconsequential, since Frummer suggests a "valid inference of
agency" based on the parent-subsidiary relationship.
There was a vigorous dissent in Frummer premised on the view
that separate incorporation is an acceptable method of escaping juris-
diction and which, as the majority opinion charged, failed to dis-
tinguish between limited liability and limited amenability. The dis-
sent protested the extension of jurisdiction "in the absence of fraud,
misrepresentation or intermingling of activities of separate corpo-
rations."' 0 9 Primarily, however, the dissent feared that the domicile
countries of the foreign corporations might choose to reciprocate
against American firms having subsidiaries within their territory.
But the majority had an answer for that which has pertinence to out-
of-state parents as well:
We are not unmindful that litigation in a foreign jurisdiction
is a burdensome inconvenience for any company. However, it is part
of the price which may properly be demanded of those who exten-
sively engage in international trade. When their activities abroad,
either directly or through an agent, become as widespread and ener-
getic as the activities in New York conducted by Hilton (U.K.),
they receive considerable benefits from such foreign business and
may not be heard to complain about the burdens.110
106. 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
107. Id. at 431, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
108. Id.
109. 19 N.Y.2d at 540, 227 N.E.2d at 855, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
110. Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
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It seems almost unthinkable that any general rules could be ap-
propriate in the maze of case law involving "out-of-state corpora-
tions"; 111 yet they produce an irresistible urge to try. The "single
economic entity" analysis may be overly simple; but recent Court of
Appeals decisions indicate a propensity to follow this type of approach
and a future decision may provide the opportunity for the court to
produce some badly needed predictability in this area of the law.
On the other hand, perhaps enough good would be accomplished
if only the "Cannon rule" and the "rule of limited amenability"
could be forever put to rest.
111. This highly descriptive and useful term was coined by Professor George D.
Hornstein of New York University School of Law, to whom the writer acknowledges
his debt.

